Session Summary OpenPGP Email Summit 2018
Session 1: new standard for OpenPGP: TLS 1.3, RFC4880bis - Phil Zimmermann
- existing standard: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880
- new standard draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis
- working group: https://tools.ietf.org/wg/openpgp/
- Phil: I've been away from OpenPGP for a long time. I am not as well-versed as I have to be to address this.
- Difficulty to rip out legacy: Block ciphers, 3DES, compression algorithms. But TLS1.3 was able to do it.
- Werner: 3DES is optional in rfc4880bis. Most implementations follow rfc4880bis.
- Phil: TLS group approach to getting rid of old stuff. a lot more MUST. less choices. trim down as much as possible. get rid of MDC, replace it with authenticated encryption
- Werner: will not work. glad we could remove non-MDC, but that troubled people. can't rip out MDC, it works, even though it's not perfect. Not an online protocol, have to deal with long term storage.
- PGP2 is also dead.
- Phil: we can have software implementations to pressure users to upgrade their key by deprecating their old one. In the old days we didn't have organic/automatically updating in software. Today brwsers and app-us auto-update.
- Werner: Long-term-support distributions, only slowly support modern algos. Redhat. Five years(+).
- Bart: Symantec is a problem. It took EFAIL to deprecate Tag-9.
- Vincent: People would have done it earlier, if messages had been rejected earlier.
- Werner: No.
- Phil: Vendors respond to angry customers. Invisible hand of the free market.
- Phil: The OpenPGP universe is a dumpster fire, a mess. I understand Werners argument. But I am not convinced.
- Werner: Everyone else is using S/MIME, which is totally broken.
- Werner: Everything has been done in the rcf4880bis IETF working group already.
- ilf: small iterations and improvements vs. empty sheet of paper to draw a standard of 2018. Think about interoperability and backwards-compatibility after.
- Phil: modernize. or dumpster fire.
- Thomas: Use Key flags for signalling (new) features, i.e. if AEAD flag exists on the key, error should be thrown if features don't match
- Phil: software upgrade feature
- Vincent: symptoms of very slow ecosystem. MDC/ECC take ages to manifest and be supported widely. OpenPGP is insanely complex to implement and maintain. only possible by reverse-engineering GnuPG decisions. faster movement!
- Phil: that takes ruthless political will. (quick poll: most in favor)
- Bart: Prisoners dilemma. if I'm the first implementer to to something, I will get shit from users. Meetings like this. Two-year timeline to deprecate things. Implementations are free to keep supporting old stuff, but the community moves on. Coordination. Less hate.
- Phil: takes a lot of political will. Other projects (telephony, messaging) were fun. But I'm getting emberrased about it. I don't want my original work to fade into eqXxxx. I'd rather revive it. I know about legacy pressures, Werner. But let's aggressively drop support for legacy and move in the same direction.
- Werner: OpenPGP.js implemented AEAD. I concinced them to keep it read-only until we have enough software to handle it. PGP is well documented.
- Salman: Let's set a comon date to make a shift. Move in the right direction. Without breaking legacy. But we have to do it.
- Bart: have to confirm decrypting from CAST5 after a certain date.
- Kristian: I maintain GnuPG in Gentoo. Two years is too short for deprecation.
- Phil: I have done a number of products where software checks a textfile on a server to check whether it's current.
- Kristian: That breaks the packaging model of Linux and BSD.
- Werner: proposal create a new self-signature with updated feature flags? Interesting idea.
- BSI: people using OpenPGP for End-to-End-encryption know about our issues.
- Phil: reward of going to newer formats. We'll gain more users. new users should only use new formats.
- BSI: now might be a good point to introduce changes.
- Vincent: rfc4880bis Version5 key format without SHA-1 fingerprints. We will have hard breakage with V5 keys.
- Phil: pressure on people to generate new keys.
- Werner: had same problem with RSA and ECC. not real hard breakage. just a matter of key distribution. but we can't use ECC by default now.
- Vincdendenent: V5 keys will not be compatible.we can restrict what we expect from clients implementing V5. no reason e e why a V5-implementation should use non-AEAD.
- Werner: thats 's in rfc4880bis.
- Phil: let's remove the option to generate old keys.
- Werner: mobile phones.
- Vincent: let's be more aggressive about optimizing the spec we have. Shaving off bits here and there. l l l
- paint fresh, start fresh.
- Phil: Fit into existing syntactic framework. We can do that.
- Bart: Protonmiail will probably generate curve25519 keys for all users in a few months. We'll tell users to update their client. It would be better to do that collectively. All implementations shoudldlld have ECC support by now
- That took a decade.
- Phil: What I'm proposing that we chance how we think about this. It took a decade because we didn't think quick.
- Phil: TLS had to do it. Snowden revelations as a motive. IETF dropped a lot of cyphers and algorithms after Snowden..
- Werner: TLS implementations support 1.3 and 1.2 - and even 1.1 and 1.0. There are 15 year old systems in production.
- Phil: Sysadmins long felt obligated to support old browsers. After Snowden: fuck them, update their browser. All browsers have automatic updating now. We should be doing that for all of our clients. Through app stores on mobile devices. We are making security products. They should update.
- Phil: Sofware can urge users to actively make new keypair when it supports new ciphers.
- Vincent: I agree. Let's switch to ECC. Large partge parts of the ecosystem are ready. Let's not take another ten years.
- Phil: I agree. Let's use 25519.
- Vincent: We'll update autocrypt.
- Phil: RSA was obsolete the day it was created.
- Q: If Phil is advocating for new keys, why doesn't he have a new key?
- Phil: PGPTools is nagging me to pay for it.
Session 2: SKS keyserver - Kristian Fiskerstrand
- keyserver pools: [https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php#pool_hkps https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php]
- Kristian: want to talk about 3 topics: 1. the new pool requirements, 2. stripping usr ids? 3. improving performance of keyserver
- Kristian: in the last few months, to be in the hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net you need to have a clustered instance
- [https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php#pool_hkps ]Kristian: https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php#pool_hkps: currently only 5 servers run by 2 operators. want to ask the community if that's OK or should we go back to lots of keyservers
- Kristian: privacy of user ids, should we store them?
- Jenkins makes a request to the pool every time it starts, this hammers new keyservers
- Bart: Web Key Discovery: https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD
- Kristian: Would rather avoid debate about key discovery
- Vincent: we (Patrick from enigmail) whther the keyserver network should be the default mechanism for key discovery. feels like a lot of responsibility to automatically push keys irrevcably to the keyserver network. suggested sending keyss to the mailvelope server, which allows removing keys from the keyserve (and validates email addresses). If we need to change the defaults we need a drop in replacement for the pooI. Specifically I'd like to have some different semantic cahnge anythign about how SKS operates have had no success so far. WE've been thinking about having a new keysever on keys.openpgp.org and operate that. there are a lot of questios about how to do that successfully. but mailveleope's success maybe something with a more neutral braning, operated closely by the software vendors, maybe that's a direction that can work better and avoid provlems problems the pool is having right now
- Werner: shall we allow key external signatures on the keyserver? My key is 6MB because of third party signatures. It's not really helpful, if we continue to use key signing, is it better to have a separate service for third party signatures? [Kristian: putting this down as under user id stripping, what data should keyservers hold]
- ?: interested in misbehaving keyservers, particularly echolocate keyservers.
- Phil: what kind of traffic density? K: about 350GB data / month. I'm running on 3 VMs. SKS has problem that it's a single instance. Instead of making SKS we're just using multiple servers. If you enable caching on the reverse proxy and if you cluster you can make a reliable instance (as long as one of the nodes is working). Want to discuss, should we do that failover on the keyserver pool? Or on the client? If a client receives an error, should it try again a few times? At the moment there's no retry in dirmanager, so I put the clustered requirement to reduce the number of complaints about failures, timeouts. Currently debugging some cache issues on BSD.
low number of operators
- should we be encouraging more operators to cluster? or ask clients to handle errors?
- ouch i cna't keep up with the notes
- Paul: is there another issue, whatever happened in March? Before that, my keyserver was fine, then it wasn't
- Phil: maybe we need an easier mechanism from removing keys from keyservers? Should they be in the keyserver forever?
- Werner: if a they is compromised, there's no way to revoke the key then
- Kristian: another option would be that SKS only reply to fingerprints
- Phil: You could handle a removal request by stripping everything except the
- Vincent: user id stripping, don't think it's possible because if you drop the user ids you lose the key preferences
- K: you could have key preferences in a direct key signature. [Does GnuPG support this?]
- V: either way this is a thing the client would have to do. You can only do [user id stripping] with keys that are generated under this new regime
- You couldn't use the keyservers in the scenario [stripping user ids] where you need to get the full key material
- the web of trust model would also be completely broken by stripping user ids
- K: my preference would be this is optional, and allow clients to do it. At some point in time we might need to, that's why i want this discussion now.
- isn't it a GDPR issue, that it's not just *your* personal information by the *signee*'s personal information?
- if this becomes a legal problem the server's going to be the one on the hook
- possibilty of using other data in the key to specify that this key shouldn't be stored in the keyserver
- SKS doesn't do cryptographic verifications so someone could still trick the keyservers.
- Sanjana: Why is that? Phil: it should do that, it should verify the self signatures.
- K: 2 points to that: performance. will increase the requirements on a keyserver
- Phil: we're suffering from lack of users, we aren't going to worry about performance
- K keyservers should not be treated as a trusted entity.
- Phil: as a joke people upload keys with my email address. Just because I *have to* check at the client level, it doesn't mean the keyservers should be wilfully stupid
- Issue of verification: people will take it as an assertion
- W: Key discovery can't work via keyservers! It's not reliable anyways -> remove the feature from sks
mapping from fingerprint to uid still useful
- V: there is positive feedback from Mailvelope that their private keyserver does work
- W: idea is many keyservers that replicate, no single point of failure
openpgp should not use 509's centralized model
- Andre: I'm using keyservers for discovery when I have a fingerprint. With communication hiscan get trust from this. So without user IDs I can't do it.
- W: I'm not saying you strip user IDs, but remove the *search* by user id functionality
- To echo that, all the clients would all be configured with the legit ones
- V: it's very hard to remove functionality in a client that breaks things because users say "it still works in the other clients" so you take all the flack
- K: going to point about development of SKS
did updates for new key materials at some point
- K: I'm not ot an OCAML programmer, I don't want to do major changes to the keyase. It's easier for me to require clustered keyservers than making changes to SKS. I only do small changes.
can't do large changes for time and ocaml knowledge contraints
- Bart Butler: not everything has to have tls support, e.g. backend daemons
K: Right, that's how it is. Can't use letsencrypt because custom cert is used today
- Phil: i haven't seen this [sks] in action, but I know years ago we used to use MIT, there was all this vandalism. When PGP corporation developed their ownkeyserver, it checked things,
pgp global directory: checked with confirmation mail
pleasure to use: singular mapping, no bogus keys wouldn't it be nicer to li to live in a world where we don't have so much crap on the keyservers?
- (pmg): even so putting a barrier to adding a key, that would help wouldn't it?
- when you're gossiping with other operators, how does the validation get synced?
validation and federation impossible to combine
- Paul: Didn't know you weren't an ocaml developer
- elephant in the room: sks is unmaintained?
- K: talked to casey, very much welcome alternative implementations!
- Kristian: I would be very happy for alternative implementations of SKS besides https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver
it's called sks-keyservers.net, but historically we accepted other implemenations need to decide on minimum requirements definitely right approach, instead of doing large rewrites on sks
- (gnome guy): maybe get rid of keyserver network?
- reasons we have them aren't compelling anymore, requirements have changed
- maybe we need just a revocation server
- rly differntotaltotal
totally differnet set of problems if we're only implementing a revocation server
you can reuse all this stuff for free like Certificate Transparency
- V: dropping key discover altogether is a very tough decision to make. (email -> key)
- K: key discovery on keyservers is misuse
- V: maybe drop searching on substrings?
- W: someone will download all the keys and make fake keys
Session 1: Autocrypt level 2
- will not break Autocrypt level 1
which features do we want?
- key sync (public/private)
- detection of active attack
- alternate routing
- ways to integrate with non-autocrypt topics (alternate force-encryption, etc)
- key refresh (ECC? PQ?)
- Protected headers
- key rotation
- workflow for device loss
- MIME simplification
- policies for subkey rotation/expiration
- search of content of encrypted messages
- github process
- regular IRC meetings
Can we do "level 1 compliant" badging?
How can we evaluate that a client isn't level 1 compatible?
- propose asking about "level 1" compliance on mailing list. if no unanswered objections are raised in two months.
potentially try to launch level 2 work before IFF 2019
- ECC keys
- protected headers
- MIME simplification
- multi-device synchronization
- verified contacts (and their implication of how the state changes)
- solicit level 1 compliance reviews
Session 2: MUA state sync
- What we want do sync?
- secret key --> answer (autocrypt setup message)
- Autocrypt state
- Address Book
- alternative routing
- general perferences of MUA (Signature, HTML, ...)
- rule settings policy
- tags, etc
- public key ring
- filter rules
- per message session key
- Properties to sync
- easy to use
- authenticated and confidential
- more then two devices
- Ways we could the sync?
- kolab protocol an option?
- there needs to be a pairing mechanism -> whats the easiest way
- MLS -> group messages protocol
- syching protocol needs to allow message loss
- Risk and side Effects?
- end-up syncing to a device you want to sync to (avoid wire tap channel)
- deleting, duplication
- sync fails (deletetion of keys, ....)
- lateral movment after compromise
- Seperate in multiple Layers
Session 3: Counter MITM
[Unstructured follow-up to the Counter-MITM paper presentation in the morning.]
Q: What kind of in-person key verification mechanisms did you envision? QR? etc?
A: Paper is agnostic, some mechanism for transmitting bootstrap data, fingerprint + 2 secrets. One (invite token) secret to authenticate initial message, trigger response with PGP key. Response triggers encrypted message containing second token, proving verification completed, also including fingerprint of initator. (Discussion, whiteboard)
Q: What do "system messages" look like?
A: First message is cleartext, the rest encrypted. Using headers inside the encrypted part to transmit data. Useful for other MUAs to know, so as to be able to suppress these messages. Very similar to DSNs, but modified so as not to be recognized as such, so as not to trigger messages back.
Q: Discussion about time-outs in the verification flow...?
A: Currently unlimited, policy needs to be defined.
Q: Are separate keys stored for different contexts, groups/vs. 1:1?
A: Yes, the groups use the latest verified key, Autocrypt just uses the latest received key. (discussion about keys)
Q: What about key change notifications like Signal/WhatsApp?
Q: What does it mean if keys change?
A: Delta is very simple, if any bit of the key changes, it's a new key.
Session 3: Webmail / Autocrypt
- Mailvelope wants to integrate autocrypt.
- Some discussion on how to integrate autocrypt into Mailvelope has already happend.
- Startmail looks into moving encryption-operations to the client-side, too.
- Autocrypt doesn't tell anything about the techniques for implementations
- Roundcube maintainers have a (not yet) document what would be needed to better support autocrypt
- Mailvelope handles ciphertext, doesn't take care of top-level mime-headers.
- It must be helped by server-provided Code to produce pgp/mime-messages, or read/set autocrypt-headers.
- Mailvelope and Gmail don't work together in "MIME-mode"
- Some email-providers help autocrypt e.g. by DKIM-signing autocrypt-headers
- autocrypt doesn't require signing its headers
- (Some discussion about DKIM)
- (Some discussion abpt being attackable/disruptable)
- Would the autocrypt peer state neout autocryed to be stored in the encrypted module, or not?
Session 4 - Multiple Key Discovery methods
Session about how MUA's that support multiple key discovery methods handle them and how to handle different answers Collection of existing key discovery methods (on the right is how you search it): autocrypt - email WKD - email SKS pool - email | keyid | fpr Mailvelope keyserver - email | keyid | fpr LDAP - email | keyid | fpr DNS - email garbage pile - email | keyid | fpr keybase etc. local override (e.g. local signatures on manually imported keys or the addressbook) Garbage pile: New keyserver by Kai and PEP: only search for full user id's and validates E-Mail addresses. Only after validation the key is searchable Allows for removal We scope the discussion to lookup by email address. What is the confidence in the discovery methods. WKD: In GpgOL and protonmail and Enigmal: Keys from WKD are used directly for automatic encryption without user interaction Policy overrides e.g. local signatures are override that Enigmal and GnuPG have a list in an order where they look for keys. Concern is that Meta data leaking key sources should not always be tried. Local sources are preferabble and prefered. Meta data leakage concerns, each key discovery source has different meta data leakage DNS is especially problematic WKD only leaks the domain
Ranking and collision handling: There could be the state that different services report different keys WKD can have multiple keys in a response There was discussion about this that it might be a bad idea and should be changed in the future. Mailvelope keyserver and garbage pile both only return one result.
Strategies when multiple keys are found: Ranking - by validity or other criteria like last created subkey Encrypt to all of them - has the advantage that there is the least danger that the recipient can't decrypt the message Escalate the problem to the user
For lookup Start with no meta data leakage and little latency
Sidetrack WKD: A provider can have mutliple canonicalisation methods esp. with Unicode in the local part WKD does not really has a policy for this except something simple like lowercasing.
There should be a canonicalisation policy for WKD.
Session 4 - Signature taking over time
DKG: When you recevie a message and it is signed, we have some idea what that means, and some ideas about how it is presented to the user. When you look at messages in your archive from a year ago, that are signed, you might feel differently. Has the key expired since? Has the key been revoked since then? (or the subkey) .. lost the keys? Or the other way around, you now have a key and can verify old stuff. It's not clear what a signature means over time, with a store and forward protocol like e-mail.
Most messaging protocols don't have his, they don't have per message non-repudiating signatures.
1. What are the ways that a valid signature effects my MUA?
2. What are the ways that an invalid signature effects my MUA?
3. If I'm looking at old messages, and status now is different, does that effect what my MUA is going to do?
OpenPGP.js: Treats expiration and revocation as different. When a signature is verified, key validity is derived from signature time.
DKG: The message has many dates, which is used?
ProtonMail: Uses Received headers. Unless it is very different from the when the message was entered into the database.
GnuPG: uses timestamp on the signature itself, if the key was not expired, it is considered valid. Otherwise invalid. If it's signed before key creation time, there's a warning but considered valid. If revoked, if the revocation is due to compromise it is always invalid, if superceded, revocation time wins. Ignores all the e-mail specific data.
Usually date related failures are caused by bad clocks.
What does your MUA do differently if a signature is valid?
Outlook: Shows a green bar if the signature is valid when it is displayed. Never show any warnings or error messages, only available hidden behind the details button. For an expired signature or a revoked key, there's just no green bar and no icon, show as if it was unsigned. Never show a signed mail as less trustworthy than unsigned mail. Don't think there is much of a use case for looking at old signatures, it's mostly for current mail to prevent spear phishing etc.
Mailpile: Similar. Add delimiters within message display to show what is signed or not. If historic data indicates that the sender ususally signs, then anomalies may show a scary red icon, but otherwise the UI is relatively quiet about it.
ProtonMail: Differs depending on whether there is a key pinned for that contact. Display "nothing", a checkmark, or an X. (discussion)
Mailfence: If we have a signature, we clearly mark as green. If it's not valid, we show a red bar. And then the third case is we have a signed mail, but no key to validate, show it's signed by someone but we don't tell you if it was a good or a bad signature. Unsigned mails have no markers.
Q: Did the pros in the room do usability testing?
Mailfence: We launched iteratively, responded to user feedback.
(discussion went elsewhere)
(Whiteboard discussion of different timestamps)
DKG: Points out about 14 different data points that relate to time, that might be considered input into evaluation of the validity of a signature and communicating to the user.
MailFence: Talk about how they embed user-visible artefacts inside the (encrypted/signed) message body that make it more visible if a message is replayed.
Discussion about how signatures are used in the mail client: - Direct display - Input into evaluation of sender crypto capabilities - Input into GnuPG's TOFU database - Seeing signatures is a sign a key is in use, useful to rank keys when importing (Discussion about caching verification results, vs. evaluating every time a message is displayed.) Revocation is the main exception from caching being useful. Discussion of revocation semantics.
Outcome: Signatures and dates are being used in very different ways in different e-mail apps. Which is interesting! Room for much more conversations and learning from each-other.
Session 4 - protected headers
protected headers (memoryhole)
- current state: spec was done in 2016, some clients did implement it
- the spec didn't really evolve
- no website anymore (modernpgp.org)
- naming of the alternative subject "Encrypted message"
- implementers feedback reg. fallback
- IETF Internet draft coming up by dkg & Alexey wrapping emails in rfc822 messages (LAMB(P?)S working group IETF, spasm)
implementers feedback regarding rfc822 fallback
- fallback mode: a text part MUAs should display the user in case the client is not able to understand protected headers
- fallback mode: not optimal, because it adds just another MIME part, and increases the spec
- apple mail does include the fallback mode, mutt needs manual config, kmail shows it as well
- complaints: user get (or got, in the past) garbled message, some MUAs didn't decrypt these messages (in the past, mailfence maybe (?) still unfixed)
- complaints: threading doesn't work if based on the subject
- discussion about removing the fallback mode: pros and cons about keeping vs. removing
- schleuder: broken in the beginning when enigmail enabled protected headers by default; nowadays fixed, schleuder leaves the subject "as is" and works transparently
- K9Mail: not released / in the master branch, currently only implemented in a devel branch
- GPG4win: ?
- was there an effort directed at "all" of the MUAs asking for implementation, offering advice and help etc.: no, there wasn't such an effort; one reason for it was that there was never a complete spec
- currently rough consensus and running code: what about finalizing the spec and do a reach out to various MUAs?
- strip the spec down to a minimal level: just start with the subject, no References: etc. -> just encrypting the subject would be a good start, and could serve as a base to then do further iterations to encrypt more headers
- dkg starts a process to do an IETF draft
- feedback regarding the spec: sounds quite complicated because of multiple layers; proposal: just use the first MIME part inside the encrypted message
- the new IEFT draft might contain multiple layers as well; might make it complicated for MUAs what to display when
- protecting the From: header is complicated, because, depending on the MUA, it might be either impossible or pretty hard
- "Encrypted Message" subject: users might think that this serves as a security indicator
- proposal: remove the "Encrypted", use "No Subject" or "Subject unavailable" or "Embedded Subject" or "Hidden Subject" or no Subject: header (which are disliked by spam filters etc.)
- localization of the subject reveals the language
- fallback mode: adds additional implementation cost
- fallback mode: doesn't really help users of MUAs which doesn't support the spec (INBOX filled with mails with subject "Encrypted Message", therefore searching for a specific message based on the subject is not possible)
we need a new home
- modernpgp was the original home
- there is a repo on github which doesn't contain the content of the website
- stripping down the spec to a minimal level would be quite easy (TBA: this evening, or tomorrow morning, the latest)
- leave aside the fallback mode, or make it optional (if it's just optional, maybe leave it out right from the beginning)
- where to put the new content: depends on the IETF draft and what should go in there (S/MIME? etc.)
- we're not bound to the IETF draft, so our "new home" doesn't depend on this -> no consenus / decision where this should be hosted
keys.openpgp.org + GDPR concerns
- Kristian repeated the content of last days session: Will probably not accept email validation or other radical changes, but new SKS compatible software in the pool is possible
- Patrick: People ectually try to find keys via email addresses
- Using the pool in OpenKeychain to automatically upload keys without asking the user, is making OpenKeychain GDPR-critical.
- Patricks original idea was to use the maivelope keyserver as it validates email addresses
- Mailvelope keyserver actually works for people, but we obviously drop federation and other requirements we have in the pool
- Idea: Neutral branding of a keyserver is needed, not use mailvelope keyserver in OpenKeychain
- keys.openpgp.org as a home for this new server
- New implementation based on Sequoia PGP (Rust) in progress validating keys and verifying email addresses
- Small but stable group that manages the keyserver
- GDPR: Even a checkbox does not work as a consent, as it is not clear to the user that the key is undeletable
- OpenPGP key is 100% PII
- Verifying and deletable is required to be 100% GDRP compliant
- People who wrote the GDRP say that keyservers are no problem
- No keyserver has ever received a complaint
- Users need to complain to a data protection authority
- Conclusio: We will most likely not get a problem, we should not worry about GDRP, BUT: we can freely think about new models
- Non-exportable flag?!
- Justus: There is a difference about non-exportable and keyserver preferences
- Andre: Use the flag to specify if the key should be uploaded or not
- Vincent: Agress with the GDPR, legals issues may not be bad, still: move in the right direction
- Lawyer of Switzerland based provider says that keyserver will not have problems. But, they don't use the keyserver as it is confusing to users. They strip everything except the email addresses
- Vincent: points of discussion:
- email addresses
- third party signature
- how much of a drop-in-solution do we want?
- search by substring of user ID? If we drop that we have only lookup by IDs, which allows performance
- Non-self-singed User ID supported by OpenPGPjs?
- Justus: Do we return user ids if we only request by fingerprint?
- Vincent: No conclusion for now what to do if we lookup
- Dominik: Being a drop-in replacement, I would return all user IDs, because that is what implementations expect
- Patrick: yes, I agree
- Gmail and other have certain cleaning algorithms for email address, e.g., remove dots etc. Maybe exact matches are not enough
- Vincent: Move to a 2. iteration as it makes it complex
- This could also be implemented in the lookup tools
- Vincent: Maybe meet in the middle using a normalized email representaiton
- Vincent: Another issue: We need to lookup by long key ID (64 bits), but there can be collisions
- Patrick: For now: Don't allow long key ID collisions, later drop long key IDs, when fingerprints are in signatures
- Justus: Interface? Do we implement HKP?
- Vincent: Yep, being a drop-in-replacement
- Vincent: New point: Governance aspect
- Ask EFF to run it? or other orgs?
- Haven't talked about federation: SKS just a small number of fed nodes currently in the HKPS pool
- Not opposed to use some kind of replication
- Data set is no public, so backup, replication etc is more important
- Use OpenPGP email mailinglist for new discussions
session about unspoofable security indicators
Primary focus: html spoofing of security indicators
we want the chrome to be nearby, but the closer it is the harder it is for users to distinguish between content and chrome.
should we just get rid of the ability to see html?
what about indicators in the message list?
can we populate the sender line/headers? because those parts can't be manipulated by the body.
kmail has problems where we don't have single signature state.
pgp inline is problematic, especially for piecemeal-signed.
dkg suggests that we have only one signature state per message.
rendering mails as text-only, with a button to allow views of HTML formatting
people receive all kinds of bizarre messages.
pgp partition spec means that mails arrive with multiple statuses per part. symantec endpoint security, gpg4o both generate this.
stefan says "if there's an inline encrypted blob in a cleartext message, let the user decrypt it manually"
dkg proposes limiting cryptographic status to "cryptographic envelope" vs. "cryptographic payload" -- only use the set of layers of MIME crypto at the very outside of the message.
if we move to one-status-per-message, Mailing list signatures are going to be the first fatality.
University of Bochum sent mail to many MUAs about spoofable UI indicators. we should be prepared to link to that work when complaints come in about simplified display:
Should we ensure that insecurity indicators take up the same amount of space as security indicators, so that the space is reserved?
Andre has different security indicator levels in bars above the message, and also up in the upper right.
Bjarni (not present) is proposing showing insecurity for mails from a user who has sent all secured mails in the past. Stefan points out that this doesn't work for random spoofing from unusual addresses.
Andre points out that there's a marketing issue for plugins -- they want very visible indicators to prove that they're doing something.
maybe we can consume a lot of space by default, but let users minimize the space, and when they choose to do that, we have an opportunity to educate them to look for the smaller indicators.
Session: Timestamping for Signature validation
- Problem statement: OpenPGP digital signature validation (in most implementations) takes into account the present status (revoked/expired) of the signer's key, and displays an inaccurate/confusing signature validation message if the signer's key is revoked/expired.
- Based on the status of signer's keypair (valid/invalid) when the signature was made (timestamp), if valid - then the digital signature remains valid forever and vice versa in the other case.
- Keep states: Use a trusted third-party to maintain timestamps, and provide signature validation information in case of conflict.
- OR Either use Merkle trees to combine different hash values (using the order of nodes) to verify. E.g., the message receiver can hash every obtained signature and keeps a record of it (e.g., in a Merkle tree based database) which can be used as a verifiable medium that can be produced to court.
- In case of signer's key revocation, there's always a time between when the key was actually compromised (which could be unknown to the user) and when it was actually revoked by the user. Any signatures made during this time, would be considered as malicious. In case of having a trusted authority, the fall back can be made on the last verified signature (made by the user when the key was not compromised).
- Further to above point, instead of having a trusted authority, we can ask the signer of the message to publish the last verified state of the key on some public channel (e.g., public key servers, other channels, ...) which will serve as a datapoint for the last verified state (that can be used to make a reasonable decision e.g., signing time vs last verified state?).
Signature Validity / Display
Protonmail: No signature No key Failing signature verification
- unsigned state / broken signature
- only some indication that this key is used by this user, no manually signing of the key, you only saw some signed mails of this key
- valid signature, still no manual interaction with the key. Used many times, pulled from WKD
- full validity, same level as in S/MIME trust, someone has certified the identity
- own keys, direct signature on other keys
Concept of verified sender address: not making an assumption about identity, only make an assumption about sender address, that it was not faked.
- either message is signed but no key, or signature invalid: signature not verified
- User id matching, Enigmal doesn't do it
- no signature: nothing is displayed
- signature but no key: warning
- invalid signature: red
- limited space for showing the signature verification result
- orange: signed and encrypted but no key, because actionable: the user can click on the orange sign and try to fetch a key from a key server
- message with Autocrypt header and signature will verify as valid
Changing behavior can be monitored: if we have a history of that contact and changing signature information, then we can make assumptions about the validity of signature.
Signatures are made without context. Intended recipients field: this message is signed and should be encrypted for this and that fingerprints.
Mailpile also shows red state for signature verification fails.
Agreement: should be a binary state if a message was valid signed or not. There could be a second parameter that makes a statement about the trust on the key.
Session: Deletable Email
- What does "deletable email" actually mean? Control the period of time in which an email can be read. An attempt to reframe "Forward Secrecy" and adopt it for an archivable message format like email.
- Also messaging formats that provide "Perfect Forward Secrecy" have a window in which the messages are decryptable. Typically those time windows are small.
- OpenPGP can use rotate subkeys frequently to achieve the same thing (with a larger time window).
- Making people using the repeatedly changed key is a challenge.
- You then can't read old email — do you want that?
- Should emails be archived at all? That is a contradiction to "Forward Secrecy".
- notmuch approach: store the session key, store the message <-> session-key association. Enables deleting the encryption-key and still have acces to the message's contents.
- Another approach: re-encrypt all messages to a local key.
- There is no data destruction policy in email(-clients). Why is that? Some messengers have that ("delete this message after 1 week").
- There could be different options to maybe state a personal destruction policy, like email headers, (sub)key annotations.
- There is no way to enforce such a destruction policy in in for email, because that would require bilateral, binding agreements.
- Email being archival is a feature and one of the reasons that many businesses still keep using it: they need to archive their communication for compliance reasons.
- Deleting a message locally is not enough because there's always other people that (could) have a copy of the message, which could be reitrieved and decrypted by the key you retain.
- There is a paper describing using a new encrypting subkey for each correspondent or even per message.
- New subkeys are a problem in multi-device environments.
- sequoia thinks about weekly key rotation.
- Even a semi-yearly time window would be a huge improvement over many years or indefinite time.
- Idea: pre-generate and publish keys for "heavy rotation" of keys.
- Frequent rotation might force people to frequently consult keyservers, which can lead to leaking data (which IP wants to send a message to which recipient).
- Requiring out of band transport to get access to (rotated) keys requires a well connected online mode (problem for networkdbadly connected networks).
- Why do we are targetting small time windows (days or weeks) for an archival format like email? It might already take a day to only delivery a message.
- We need to figure out what an appropriate time window would be — for whom.
- Justus discusses two approaches how to bring Forward Secrecy to OpenPGP: https://sequoia-pgp.org/talks/2018-08-moving-forward/moving-forward.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=an6oYjikAPY